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Abstract 
 The essay deals with the difficult relationship between fiscal 
responsibility and representation: it seems that the traditional rule “no 
taxation without representation” is less and less true, as the responsibility of 
the representatives, be they those of the national parliament or of the 
representative bodies of local institutions, is no longer a real guarantee. The 
case of the Italian system is significant: local taxes have been interpreted in a 
very singular way by the constitutional case law, as the representatives’ 
responsibility connected with local government levies is limited to the 
determining only of certain aspects of the fiscal phenomenon. One first goal 
is therefore to analyse the atypical fiscal and financial responsibility of local 
administrators. 
But a specific phenomenon of the Italian Regions with a special level of 
autonomy deserves attention. These special Regions have negotiated with the 
central government a specific regime: since the constitutional 
implementation process of 2009, they dispose of undeniably high 
percentages of their territories’ tax revenue. The profiles of derived finance 
have been eliminated and it has been decided to return to the self-financing 
model, understood as the prevailing allocation in a fixed share of tax 
revenues produced within the territory. The case of the special regional 
revenues of Trentino-Alto Adige is a peculiar one and it is specifically 
studied in this essay.  
This work discusses the question of representation regarding tax revenues in 
a different way, based on a particular type of relation between the wealth-
producing context and the institutions. 
 
Keywords: Special Regions, derived finance, political representation 
 
Introduction 
 One of the more forthrightly expressive manifestations of the 
representational relation regards the decisions about the levying of taxes: by 
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virtue of the famous rule “no taxation without representation”, the power of 
taxation passes through the  of deliberation of representatives, be they those 
of the national parliament or of the representative bodies of local institutions. 
 The guarantee of the representational relations between 
representatives and taxpayers surrounding the fiscal phenomenon has been 
partly nullified, in the Italian system, by the singular interpretation of the 
tributo proprio (local tax) that constitutional case law has given with respect 
to the category of local government levies, which in the case of the 
municipalities sees the representatives’ responsibility limited to the 
determining only of certain limited aspects of the fiscal phenomenon; and in 
the case of the regions it no longer calls for areas of autonomous 
identification of elements to subject to taxation. One first goal is therefore to 
analyse the atypical fiscal responsibility – and, consequently, financial 
responsibility, or regarding the sphere of expenditure as well – of local 
administrators. 
 But a specific phenomenon, linked to the particular tax regime of the 
Italian Regions with different levels of autonomy, may lead to a further 
consideration. In line with their acts of establishment and following the 
agreements which these special Regions have negotiated with the central 
government since the constitutional implementation process of 2009, they 
dispose of undeniably high percentages of their territories’ tax revenue. The 
profiles of derived finance – those which exclude the fiscal responsibility 
profile connected with representation – have been eliminated, and it has been 
decided to support a return to the self-financing model, understood as the 
prevailing allocation in a fixed share of tax revenues produced within the 
territory. The case of the special regional revenues of Trentino-Alto Adige is 
a peculiar one: they are now solely in a fixed share, and their predictability 
depends largely on policies adopted, especially those in the economic and 
social framework, apt to enhance the production of revenues. But the 
tendency is common amongst all areas with different levels of autonomy that 
retain tax revenues. 
 This choice puts the question of representation regarding tax 
revenues in a different way: if it is true that specific responsibility of the 
representative organ is still wanting with respect to decisions of taxation, the 
political and economic orientation is, however, capable of significantly 
affecting the amount of tax revenues, and thus a particular type of relation is 
established between the wealth-producing context and the institutions, whose 
ability to provide incentive for economic growth has a positive impact on the 
resources that can be spent for the region. 
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I. 
 Representation and fiscal responsibility: the principle of no taxation 
without representation. 
 The expression “no taxation without representation” comes from 
laisser-faire theory: the State upholding the rule of law at first responded to it 
by availing itself of the principle of legality, and in more recent times has 
also arranged constitutional guarantees. The expression, born in the context 
of the English-speaking world to state the guarantee which the British 
Parliament gradually won in order that decisions of public spending should 
not be the exclusive domain of the Government and the Crown, has been 
followed differently in the continental environment, and in an even more 
particular manner in the legal context of nineteenth-century Italy (Morana, 
2007). Thus article 30 of the Statute, according to which no tax could be 
levied and collected unless authorised by both Houses and approved by the 
King, has ended up becoming a tool of over-centralisation at parliamentary 
level of public spending decisions: with the evolution of the form of 
government from constitutional monarchy to a parliamentary system, the 
meaning and the “contractual” import – between monarchy and Parliament – 
of the provision in question have been wholly depleted. 
 And indeed, with the passing of time this technical phrase has shown 
a significant evolution, insofar as under modern constitutions it implies 
recourse to an extensive political process, with a range of important political 
forces contributing to it, of such nature that the interest in taxation ends up 
being the outcome of an assessment broadened to the greatest extent 
possible. The guarantee of a deliberation in parliament no longer engages 
merely the interest of the individual, as might be gathered by virtue of its 
origin, but also general and public interests: nowadays it is seen “no longer 
as a right to self-taxation but rather as a strengthening of the principle of 
legality”, which entails that the law will not limit itself to being the source of 
the executive powers but “will itself contain, in whole or in part, the 
governance of the matter covered by the same reserving of authority; and this 
is a reflection of the hierarchy of the bodies and the sources, i.e. the super-
ordination of Parliament in relation to the Government and, by way of 
corollary, of the law with respect to acts of the executive” (Russo, 2002, 40). 
 What appears fundamental today, then, are the actual awareness and 
informing of public opinion in the parliamentary democracies, factors 
capable of weighing a good deal more than the electoral mechanism: since 
the conviction that governments can be controlled by politicians and by 
parties regularly subjected to elections is now perhaps less firm and well-
founded than the wish that the providing of proper and extensive information 
about them for public opinion and the taxpayer may lead to a parallel control, 
in addition to that of the constitutional and legislative procedures, of public 
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institutions’ decisions on tax revenues and expenditure. It is more necessary 
that consensus should arise from complete information than from 
parliamentary procedures; it must, then, come of an awareness of what 
legislation’s goals for the benefit of the community are (Fedele, 1978), and 
thus of what the financial requirements involved are. 
 The phenomenon of the executive branch’s increasing arrogation of 
tax matters signals a clear change of perspective. The dominant conception 
in the liberal era, which may be summed up in terms of relations of 
“coercion” between State and taxpayer, found guarantees in the reserving of 
authority to parliamentary deliberation, deemed to serve as a protection of 
the sphere of individual freedoms. 
 Conversely, in the republican constitution such reserving of authority 
has been interpreted by jurisprudence and constitutional case law as meaning 
that the law will compulsorily govern the elements needed to identify certain 
performances and the subjects bound to effect them. But above all, the 
reserving of authority to legislation has been reinterpreted in the light of the 
new solidarity-oriented approach of the constitution, which has led to an 
attenuation of guarantee-oriented profiles: these are no longer geared to 
protecting solely individual interests – those of the taxpayer – but also 
general interests (Antonini, 2005). 
 The goal-oriented dimension of fiscal solidarity has its roots in the 
principle of essential equality and thus in the inadmissibility, for the 
legislative system, to accept excessively unequal individual situations, which 
thwart the aspiration to effective equality between citizens. This goal-
oriented constraint is not necessarily guaranteed by the method of 
representation; or, rather, this last guarantee does not influence the substance 
of decisions pertaining to the taxation of assets, but only the disposition of 
taxable entities to submit to the same. 
 Therefore an exhuming of the rule “no taxation without 
representation” is of fundamental importance in order to assert the 
desirability of a responsible and informed involvement of taxpayers in taking 
up the duty of fiscal solidarity, which, however, also brings itself to bear 
upon those whose representatives, in the parliamentary procedure, may have 
opposed such taxation. Moreover, it does not give a guarantee regarding the 
“goodness” of taxation, or the fact that taxes are aimed at producing 
mechanisms of redistribution, thus of equity. 
 The invoking of the “consensus method” is desired by those who 
deem that it has in part been overshadowed by the so-called “bureaucratic 
taxation” model which, first with the asceticism of the welfare state and then 
as a result of the phenomenon of the surmounting of territorial limits – the 
now too-often evoked “globalisation” – has set itself as an alternative to the 
other model, that which links tax levying to a control exercised by the very 
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same parties who are recipients of the taxes. It is, indeed, the “bureaucratic 
taxation” model which, in a context of marked growth of public spending in 
function of the guarantee of social rights geared towards rendering uniform 
the citizens’ life potential, as well as of openness and communicativeness of 
the national economic systems – permitting a centralisation of the power of 
taxation in the hands of the national government – has appeared as the 
decisive and primary condition for the fulfilment of public interests in 
abidance with the formal duty of parliamentary deliberation. 
 The same principle of self-taxation has acquired new prosperity and 
vigour in recent times, concomitantly with the strengthening of the 
autonomous districts, insofar as the effective exercise of the power of 
taxation by local bodies is often legitimised in terms of consent to taxation 
by the populations concerned. This is a matter falling within the broader 
question of fiscal subsidiarity (Buzzacchi, 2013), extolled in Italy in the 
previous decade (Antonini, 2005) but now, because of the weighty 
economic/financial crisis, evoked decidedly less often in the scientific and 
political debate. 
 The considerations that may be expressed on the relations between 
fiscal solidarity and consensus of the taxpayers in a context where there are 
perhaps several makers of tax legislation, coinciding with various levels of 
regional institutions, are the following. Of course the scope of parliamentary 
deliberation in matters of tax levying is indisputable, to the point that there 
are those who have observed that the old English maxim “no taxation 
without representation” can also be read in reverse, to stress that it is not 
only the democratic-representative character of those who decide that 
legitimises the levy, but also the levy that confers fullness of meaning to 
political representation. The maxim obtained with this reversal of perspective 
would then be “no representation without taxation”, which is an expression 
of the awareness that only if a political representation brings itself to bear on 
its constituents’ assets can the democratic supervision that they carry out be 
effective (D’Atena, 2009). A demonstration of the grounding of this 
principle – especially in its reverse version – is found in the issue of the 
European legislative system, where the absence of taxation power is, without 
doubt, closely linked to the EU institutions’ low level of representativeness. 
 It is therefore established that the need to constrain the “sovereign’s” 
power of taxation was already felt in pre-democratic times, and since then 
has been satisfied by the provision that a certain representation of those 
concerned by taxes must authorise such decisions; this need is still felt today, 
in an era in which the tax burden has reached levels demanding quite 
considerable sacrifices of taxpayers. The latter must have the ability to 
demand that taxes on property be established by the lone democratically 
legitimised body, be it parliament or the regional assembly. The observation 
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drawn from this is that the link between representation and the duty to pay 
taxes is not in doubt. Where such power shows itself in a role of imposing a 
burdensome performance on individuals, it is without question desirable that 
it be exercised in accordance with forms and methods that respect their will, 
even when the imposition fulfils a function benefitting the entire community. 
 What may appear questionable is a possible distortion of that link 
between taxation and representation, which indeed is usually defined in 
terms of “self-taxation”. If it is true that the “self-taxation” which arises from 
decision-making processes that have taken place in representative bodies is 
the desirable form of the phenomenon, it is, however, also necessary that 
individual communities’ decisions on tax revenues, which those 
communities intend to use for their own benefit, have an accurate perception 
of the financial requirement which a more extensive redistributive operation 
involves. If the self-taxation implies that the individual local communities 
will be able to take decisions that disregard the general interest reasons for 
levying the tax and instead remain anchored in strictly local evaluations, this 
principle and the constraint of “consensus” will cause some perplexity. The 
fear, indeed, is that decisions of local communities will disregard respect for 
the essential legitimating factor: in other words, that they will not seek to 
meet goals of redistribution and fiscal solidarity, but rather limit themselves 
to answering local-oriented interests, ensuring that resources levied remain in 
the district. 
The functioning of regional public finance in Italy can now be analysed. 
 
Local taxes and finance derived therefrom in the Italian legislative 
system 
 With the question of the relation between consensus and taxation – 
which ought to be the very core of representation – being framed, our 
attention can now turn to the scope of local entities’ financial autonomy in 
terms of powers of taxation. 
 It can be stated that the revenues of local entities in Italy are largely 
made up of taxes of which national law allocates the proceeds, in whole or in 
part, to these entities: the latter are instituted by national law, which 
establishes their governance except as regards those aspects expressly 
remitted to their autonomy. 
 This is what is considered “local tax”: starting from the assumption 
that only a tax instituted by regional law would be regional, it has come to be 
recognised that the areas in such regard are quite restricted and that the 
phrase to be seen as prevailing is that of the “derived local tax”, i.e. of a levy 
established by the central government the proceeds from which are used by 
the Region. 
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 From this has resulted the delineation of a “mixed” system, within 
which the regional tax revenues have come to be made up mainly of derived 
taxes (Amatucci, 2013) and of regional-national partnerships, whereas a 
smaller, residual, space has been reserved for the autonomous taxes, since 
there are few remaining sources of wealth not yet taxed by the central 
government and therefore available to the Regions. 
 The outcome of this evolution is thus that of a phenomenon which 
can hardly be defined as true autonomy (Gallo, 2015). The local entities’ 
space of autonomy for taxation is in fact remitted to the legislator who, 
whilst having accorded to the Regions the power to establish their own taxes, 
at the same time has limited that power by instituting the prohibition of 
double taxation, i.e. excluding any tax imposed on the same element by both 
the national and regional authorities. 
 This state of things is causing the Regions’ legislative taxation 
powers to shrink, and they will probably be able to act in exercise of genuine 
autonomy only within the framework of the so-called “fees” and “special 
purpose charges”, or in the fixing of local derived tax rates between the 
minimums and the maximums set by national law. And, from the standpoint 
of a meaningful connection between the responsibility for taxation and that 
for spending, the situation does not seem consistent (Winer, Kenney, Hettich, 
2010); nor does it seem consistent with local political autonomy – as 
understood by the Italian Constitution – as a freedom of the Regions to carry 
out their own policies within the scope of their authority (Gallo, 2015). 
 The development of local taxation towards a greater responsibility is 
proving to be, for the moment, purely theoretical, even with respect to the 
spontaneous orientation of the Regions and local entities themselves, which 
have prevented the imposition of local taxes from increasing the already 
heavy overall tax burden, for which the national taxes in force are certainly 
not intended to be substituted. 
 The item to stress, therefore, is that of a legislative framework and, 
indeed, that whereby spending decisions are ascribable to the Regions and 
local entities, decisions financed by shares of national taxes and by derived 
local taxes, thus, overall, from national sources. This fact cannot fail to pose 
questions at the level of the representation/responsibility cycle, especially in 
light of the considerations expressed regarding the phrase “no taxation 
without representation”. But the particular situation of the Regions with 
differentiated autonomy, and specifically of the two autonomous Provinces, 
seems to indicate a different scenario and alternative solutions. 
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The financing of the special Regions: the centrality of the allocation of 
tax revenues 
 The singular episode that will now be recounted is that of the 
agreements which the two autonomous Provinces, and then, on their model, 
other Regions with differentiated autonomy, have negotiated with the central 
government so as to establish a financial regime apt to ensure them adequate 
resources. If indeed the legislative framework of approximately fifteen years 
ago seemed that of a situation providing greater benefit for the special 
Regions, the evolution of the past few years has instead shown a strong 
subjection, even for these Regions, to unilateral interventions of the central 
government. Their authority regarding tax revenues had initially been framed 
as abstractly more extensive and limited “only” by the general principles of 
tax legislation; and the question of local taxes, which has been described 
above in general terms with respect to all the autonomous entities, seemed to 
present fewer restrictions than those of the special entities. But the case law 
of the Constitutional Court in these years of economic and financial crisis 
has come to include principles of financial coordination amongst the 
constraints to which the entities with different levels of autonomy are 
subject. 
 The special status Regions’ need for certainty and stability of tax 
revenues – plainly apparent if one considers that the resources administered 
by these regions are hardly insignificant, exceeding, overall, €40 billion per 
year, amounting in 2013 to 23% of the entire expenditure commitment 
concerning them – has led them to seek negotiation procedures with the 
central government, potentially useful both in obtaining help both for their 
differentiated autonomy to attain the objectives of stability and alignment 
and in taking up direct coordination of the local entities’ finances. 
 In 2009 negotiations seeking to determine the financial relations 
between the Government and the individual Regions and autonomous 
Provinces were begun. It was the Trentino Alto Adige Region that initiated 
the process: in particular, since 2009 three agreements have been made, 
converging with the 2009, 2013 and 2014 laws on stability. 
 When looking with specific attention at the model constituting the 
reference for all the special autonomous districts – that of the Trentino Alto 
Adige Region (Guella, 2015; Postal, 2011) – one may begin with the Milan 
agreement of 2009 and its subsequent transposal into the 2010 budget, in 
accordance with which that region has established a system of relations with 
the central government that seems rather novel, and which should be able to 
shelter it in part from a development presenting some quite burdensome 
prospects for the autonomous districts. The novelty consists in the 
establishment of revenue sharing, against a waiver of proceeds previously 
anticipated; in the broadening of powers of taxation with respect to national 
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and local taxes; in the acquisition of the exclusive authority in matters of 
local finance and, above all, in a particular mode of assistance in meeting 
public finance goals: the Region and the Provinces have agreed to take on 
competencies devolved by the central government and to finance them, thus 
realising their solidarity contribution to the broadened public finances. 
 The primary goal pursued with the aforementioned successive 
agreements has been an affirmation of the connection between resources and 
functions. This presupposes a system of necessary ascertaining of the 
adequacy of the allocations of means compared with competencies. The 
model derived therefrom is, in essence, based exclusively on jointly 
controlled tenths, correlated with a broad responsibility of a distinctly 
“functional” nature: this means that the special Region and the autonomous 
Provinces have relinquished various other non-tax revenue items, which over 
time had been allotted to them, to link the sum of the jointly controlled fixed 
share items prescribed in the acts of establishment to the financing of a set of 
functions much broader than the original. In this way the principle of 
connection has been respected and realised. 
 The regional revenues for Trentino-Alto Adige are once again only 
those in fixed share, with the advantage of predictability and the particular 
characteristic of being dependent on public policies capable of generating 
and producing revenues and on the fiscal policies pursued in the Region: this 
has eliminated the dimension of apportionment depending on the central 
government, which was highly discretionary. Thus the goal of stability and 
programmability of resources is favoured, and there is also a further 
participation of the autonomous entity in remediation and equalisation, 
having taken the form of assumption of new competencies without weighing 
on the treasury. The Provinces have taken on new functions within the 
sphere of authority of their autonomy, with no subsequent parallel transfer of 
resources. The central government has derived benefit from this, having 
relinquished functions without needing to allocate any resources related 
thereto: the district has been allocated the set of public activities that it is 
capable of taking on by reason of the amount of the funds anchored by the 
act of establishment in the autonomous Region or Province. 
 The special local body has also benefited, more on the qualitative 
than on the quantitative level: the special nature, that is, should not reside in 
greater availability of resources for equal responsibility, but in the particular 
capacity to take on a broader set of competencies (to which the correlated 
allocation of optimally managed resources corresponds) (Guella, 2015). 
 Special financial autonomy is thus characterised by a significant 
proportion of autonomous resources – which remain in the territory – 
enabling the realisation of the fullest possible autonomy in terms of 
correlated allocation of competencies. The functions not exercised at the 
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national level – where only those which by definition cannot be regional 
remain – are growing, and for them the challenge is to operate an efficient 
management so that decentralised exercise of the functions turns out, 
concretely, to be less costly than is observable when the competencies are 
kept under national authority (on the qualitative level). 
 The logic behind this model is that the resources will “remain” for the 
special Region, in that either they are produced locally or their most 
“productive” use will be local. There is no longer merely a conception of 
“financial” speciality, to which in fact is added an “instrumental” view of the 
autonomy of revenues and spending: the resources are instrumental in 
acquiring the broadest possible range of functions, with the intention of 
exercising them at costs lower than those incurred by the central government 
(Postal and Guella, 2011). 
 The system for guaranteeing the linkage of resources and functions 
developed by the first reform of 2009-10 was therefore based on the waiver 
of regional and provincial resources, and on the two Provinces’ acquisition 
of further competencies. To this was added the lever of local financing, set 
under the full responsibility of the two autonomous Provinces, as is 
consistent with a special regionalism wherein local autonomy makes up an 
essential factor of the “Region system”. The next reform to the act of 
establishment was in the same direction: an Agreement at the end of 2013 
merged into the stability law for 2014. This has entailed further delegations, 
once again without prejudice to the national treasury, as well as new 
precision on provincial competencies regarding local financing. 
 The result is that “the whole local government financial system – 
including municipal finance – has been placed under the responsibility of the 
special autonomous entity, which answers to the central government only for 
its overall balances (on the expenditures side, with its own internal stability 
pact), and becomes responsible also for governing local taxes (on the 
municipal revenues side)” (Guella, 2015, 27). 
 Finally, with the third Agreement of 15 October 2014 between the 
central government, the Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol Region and 
autonomous Provinces, with waivers of fiscal areas and guarantees of 
predictability of resources, an additional quantitative contribution for the 
needs of remediation of the national public accounts was planned. The 
Trentino-Alto Adige Region and the two autonomous Provinces agreed, with 
the central government, the amount of a specific aid package for the public 
accounts, taking place through the negotiation of a precise quantum of 
assistance for public financing objectives. The Provinces’ contribution is 
thus on a voluntary basis, without unilateral imposition, obtaining the result 
of respect, in the future, of the stability of the structure by virtue of the 
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detailed forecast of the quantitative profiles of the assistance for public 
financing objectives. 
 To recapitulate, the 2009 agreement has been followed by a triple 
revision, a fact which demonstrates that the goal pursued – a reassuring 
financial stability – has still not been attained, but that this is precisely the 
outcome sought. The process has continued and is reflected in the 2014 and 
2015 stability laws, extending the scope of central government functions to 
be transferred and expanding the exclusive authority in matters of local 
finance. 
 In a scenario of precarious and unstable overall financial relations for 
the autonomous districts, such a structure of reciprocal relations between the 
central government and the autonomous Provinces clearly appears to be a 
result of effective “guarantees” for the latter. The extent to which this model 
is the coherent outcome of financial autonomy, and the manner in which it 
relates to the subject of representation and fiscal responsibility, must now be 
ascertained. 
  
The particular mechanism of responsibility in the special Regions’ 
political and economic policy in relation to revenue maximisation. 
 The assessment that can be formulated shows that the prevailing 
nature of the finances of the special Regions and the autonomous Provinces 
remains that of a sharing in national tax revenues: indeed these make up the 
predominant source of finance, and there is now little ambition to switch to a 
structure based on genuine power of taxation. This guarantees a substantial 
maintaining of the autonomous entities’ authority in revenues, achieving 
certainty and stability thereof; but it also marks the waiving of the use of 
taxes that can be called local. 
 It can thus be stated that, overall, the Regions with different levels of 
autonomy have obtained a structure quite distinct on the financial level from 
that of the other administrations; they have the assurance, for a few years at 
least, of a different treatment in terms of help in meeting goals in public 
finances and the internal stability pact; in many cases they acquire authority 
with respect to local taxes and, finally, agree to drop their litigation with the 
central government. One may wonder whether this can be called financial 
autonomy, and whether these Regions can be content with a system of 
funding for their expenditure that still depends on mechanisms of simple 
transfer. Given the condition of the ordinary Regions, this new season of the 
special Regions’ finances is indubitably more favourable; but for all of them 
the model of real financial autonomy, based on the local taxes category – the 
role of which, in our system of public accounts, is becoming more and more 
irrelevant – is fading in the distance. 
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 Thus it seems that the conclusion to be drawn, and which the Court of 
Auditors itself suggests, is that the special Regions count, at least, on the 
constituting of a unitary framework of fundamental principles and general 
criteria for all Regions, surpassing the present phase marked by bilateral 
agreements not confirmed by the acts of establishment: such a change would 
already contribute to an enhancement of their autonomy. With the attainment 
of a model of effective fiscal autonomy still awaited, the question remains 
whether the regime that has been negotiated in the special Regions for the 
coming years wholly evades any logic of representation or at least of 
responsiveness, or whether, to some degree, the working of such a principle, 
even in a context of absence of a traditional mechanism of responsibility 
linked to the vote, can be discerned. 
 Legal theory is quite rigorous on this point, condemning the failure of 
the federalist fiscal model and the departure from the principles and 
mechanisms of financial responsibility. Indeed, it has been observed that 
“financial autonomy should make it possible for the body having rights to 
obtain directly the necessary means through its own levying of tax, approved 
by the local community which benefits from such functions, independently 
of the choices made by the central government; even if this may never occur 
absolutely, because the resources so obtained are not necessarily sufficient 
for the exercise of the functions falling to the local body”. But above all, it 
has been noted that “a democracy cannot function without the community’s 
being responsible for its activities, as pertains to obtaining the financial 
resources required for the exercise of the functions which it resolves to 
exercise: the freedom to levy tax is essential in order to involve the lesser 
territorial group in the administration of the local power, in accordance with 
the greatest exigencies of democratic life” (Catelani, 2013; Uricchio, 2013; 
Gallo, 2015). 
 Moreover, certain economic studies that have analysed the political 
economy models of taxation consider, amongst the determinant factors, the 
existence of certain democratic institutions – the foremost of which being the 
right of citizens to participate in competitive elections –, just as they take 
into consideration the existence and protection of property rights (Padovano, 
Petretto, 2010). It is therefore undeniable, both from the standpoint of public 
law jurisprudence and from that of studies in economics, that the dimension 
of political representation is crucial in order to affirm mechanisms of 
virtuous financial autonomy, as much on the side of the dynamics of taxation 
as on that of the spending choices. Such an approach would lead one to 
express an almost disparaging assessment of the solutions attempted of late 
in the special autonomy districts, where the role of derived local taxes and of 
local taxes strictly speaking is henceforth non-existent. 
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 And yet such a conclusion appears too reductionist, especially in light 
of the good working of autonomy within the Region that has opened this 
approach, Trentino-Alto Adige, and rather leads one to wonder whether there 
exist mechanisms of political representation, other than the traditional ones, 
capable of providing support for and confirmation of the productivity of a tax 
system. 
 The investment – in terms of negotiation with the central government 
– that the Region and the two Provinces have put in place in order to attain 
the financial status described above counts on the ability of these territories 
to demonstrate their “administrative” capacity in the arena of the functions 
involved. The tax regime sought seems to wish to be compared only with 
parameters of a functional nature; therefore it will be the assessment of its 
management efficiency that gives rise to any surplus for the benefit of the 
local government, which in this manner will see confirmation of the validity 
of the model of resources-functions linkage. 
 The management efficiency, and more generally the administrative 
capacity, will be reflected in a single and significant parameter: the sum of 
tax revenues, which is transferred to the Region in a fixed portion the amount 
of which obviously increases by virtue of growth in the Region’s wealth. 
Where economic growth, result of the improvement of social well-being, 
gives rise to higher incomes, it will cause greater revenues, of which a fixed 
portion will be transferred to the Region and the Provinces. They will 
therefore have every interest in carrying out functions – i.e. policies – under 
a system of efficiency but especially under highly efficacious policies, i.e. 
capable of giving results amounting to real improvement in economic and 
social terms. The productive capacity to administer will entail a dual effect: 
that of generating possible surpluses, if the functions cost less than as 
defined in line with the principle of linkage; and that of inducing well-being 
and fostering the production of greater wealth, from which will arise the 
induced effect of a more plentiful tax revenue. Revenue that flows into the 
central government’s treasury, and which the central government guarantees 
in a fixed proportional share. 
 The mechanism therefore appears to be grounded in close relations 
between virtuous administrative activity and size of tax revenue, which is 
unquestionably intended to produce a high degree of satisfaction amongst the 
citizens, whose fiscal capacity increases if policies are well conceived and 
implemented, with a view to fostering economic growth in the district. And 
here, the particular factor of local taxation must also be considered, remitted 
to the governance of the regional authority, which in this perspective 
becomes true director of a productive and social system that, in the interest 
of all institutional levels, must bring about a strong capacity of 
administration. 
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 It seems that in these districts there is a switch from the fiscal 
responsibility typical of the representation mechanism to a different 
responsibility, of “functional” nature, where the citizen’s control of the use 
of fiscal resources does not occur to a very significant extent as a result of 
the vote but has as its reference the progress of the district’s growth, which 
produces tax revenue. The efficacy of regional spending, which translates 
into policies and functions apt to give impulse to development and well-
being, finds in the tax revenues generated a parameter by which the 
administrators’ capacity may be assessed in its quality and productivity. Put 
in a different way, taken to the extreme – but at the same time effective –, 
financial responsibility seems to find its most important comparative element 
in tax revenues, the growth of which is symptomatic of good local policies 
and establishes a relationship of responsiveness between administrators and 
administered that seems to function outside of the model of political 
responsibility connected to representation. The latter, according to this view, 
is deployed when the fiscal system of these districts is bound to local or 
derived taxes, with respect to which the representatives make choices for 
which they must answer to their citizens in various ways, but especially at 
elections; but it does not work if the choice of the fiscal model is based on 
the fixed portion of tax revenues, of which the increase or decrease is the 
responsibility of institutions, institutions which can determine that increase – 
or decrease – with an exercise of political-administrative functions able to 
conform to those revenues. 
 Thus functional responsibility seems to replace the fiscal 
responsibility typical of the phrase “no taxation without representation”: the 
consistency of the governors’ decisions with the will and interests of the 
governed still obtains through the dynamics of the vote, which, however, 
does not convey a mandate or an indication regarding the quality and 
quantity of the tax levy, but rather expresses the level of the citizens’ 
satisfaction with policies the success of which produces growing wealth and, 
consequently, increased tax revenues available for spending that fosters the 
district’s well-being. It is clear that the mechanism of political representation 
is not lacking in these autonomous institutions, but rather conveys an 
intention different from that which later determines financial responsibility. 
Given the nature of the financial revenues, there is no mandate that voters 
can give to elected officials regarding tax decisions; but the vote that 
produces representation can still be a statement of approval or disapproval 
for an autonomy in spending which may or may not have been able to 
produce growth, and thus financial wealth and, in the last analysis, tax 
revenue. 
 Here the definition of “democratic supervision” given above becomes 
valid again: only from a correct and broadened informing of public opinion 
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and the taxpayer can there spring a parallel control, beyond that of the 
constitutional and legislative processes, of the decisions on public 
institutions’ revenues and spending. As already stated, it is incumbent that 
consent emanate, even more than from procedures in parliament or councils, 
from a complete informing, and thus from an awareness of what the 
institutions’ objectives – in this case local institutions – for the benefit of 
community are; of what spending decisions are adopted; of what effects 
these decisions may have on the lives and productive relations of people in 
the community and district. 
 The argument holding that “in the autonomous entities democracy 
can be said to be realised at government level when there is full awareness of 
the functions that are exercised by the local bodies” is thus applicable also in 
this context of financing not based on local decisions regarding tax levies, 
although this is formulated with respect to the situation in which the voter 
controls the local institutions’ freedom to levy tax (Catelani, 2013, 2), which 
instead will become a secondary phenomenon in the framework of the 
Trentino-Alto Adige Region’s finance system. But if mechanisms operated 
for transparency and information on the system for the gathering of resources 
and on the channels of redistribution thereof through several public offices at 
the service of the citizens and the region, one may assume that the 
supervision of the spending capacity of the regional and municipal levels 
would in any case be assured, allowing the recipients of such spending to 
assess its quality and productivity. It could be asserted that political 
responsibility would come into play especially around the spending decisions 
which, however, when judged on their aptitude to create wealth, were also 
apt to give information on the capacity to collect financial resources, insofar 
as the fixed share of revenue slated to remain in that district provided a 
measure of the “good governance” exercised there: and thus the entire 
financial circuit could succeed in being subject to an atypical, but not non-
existent, procedure of democratic supervision. 
 Finally, this particular financial structure should be evaluated in 
relation to questions regarding fiscal solidarity. If the system worked only on 
the basis of retaining tax revenues generated in the district, and thus 
allocating them to functions benefiting the community located there 
regardless of the fact that similar functions, in other parts of the country, 
were not adequately provided, it would be not be compatible with the 
constitutional framework inspired by aims of solidarity through financial 
equalisation. The novelty of the agreements examined above consists, 
however, also in their precise and concrete attention for assistance in 
attaining the objectives of national public finance, which translates into 
allocations to the treasury but, above all, in obtaining functions from the 
central government and the exercise of those functions, the conduct of which 
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becomes the task of the autonomous Provinces without the transfer of 
financial resources dedicated to them – thus anticipating that the efficient 
management by the Provinces will render those functions just as realisable as 
those administered by the local institutions, and that this will also translate 
into significant savings on expense at central government level. We have 
here an altogether new and original arrangement to foster solidarity between 
entities, which proceeds with balancing the new mode of allocating resources 
to these districts, a mode which thus not only appears useful for guaranteeing 
resources for the communities having produced them, but is also oriented 
towards achieving targets of fiscal solidarity with respect to the national 
community as a whole. 
  
Conclusion 
 It will be possible to judge the success of the model that we have 
analysed here only after a certain time, as the system gradually becomes 
operational and prepares to carry out all the tasks requested of it; thus there is 
no presumption of pronouncing an assessment now. It is certain that, at least 
in the abstract, it amounts to a rather particular option for establishing the 
financial relations between the central government and the autonomous 
entities; and that it opens the prospect for methods of democratic control 
different in character from those tried thus far and deemed indispensable. 
The good performance of the financial framework described above may be 
able to open new avenues of accountability and responsiveness of 
administrators, as well as new mechanisms of supervision and appreciation 
for citizens, on the basis of which will stand the quantum of objective 
significance that is tax revenue. 
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